Incomplete and imperfect information for sales compensation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29358/sceco.v0i15.167Keywords:
incentive compensation, sales agents, incomplete information, contracts theory, moral hazardAbstract
Sales force compensation represents the fix and / or variable payment by the company. To compensate agents based on the results, the company set a goal which is brought to their attention through the compensation plan. Applying the model of moral hazard, where the agent behavior cannot be verified, it cannot be specified in the contract what is the expected behavior of the agent. In order to make an offer to contract principal should know the effort that the agent will submit it to define the payment and the contract is determined optimally in trade between the two conflicting objectives of the two participants in the contract. Although agent behavior cannot be verified, the result of this behavior should be measurable at the end of the contract so that the employer may make the contract contingent on effort commission agent for sale of which is measured by the amount of earnings to the company.Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
Downloads
Published
15.12.2010
Issue
Section
Articles
License
Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:- Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
- Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
How to Cite
Valeanu, R. (2010). Incomplete and imperfect information for sales compensation. Studies and Scientific Researches. Economics Edition, 15. https://doi.org/10.29358/sceco.v0i15.167